上海海事大学滴水湖经济与管理论坛系列讲座第331期:Financing the Newsvendor Through Captive: Achieving Risk Shielding and Sharing with a Single Interest Rate
2025年07月02日

一、报告时间

2025619日;下午2:00

二、报告形式

图书馆B107

三、报告人

赵文辉教授   上海交通大学

四、报告主题

Financing the Newsvendor Through Captive: Achieving Risk Shielding and Sharing with a Single Interest Rate

五、报告摘要

We study the motivation for a manufacturer (she) to use her working capital to found with external investors a captive company to finance the inventory procurement of a capital-constrained retailer (he). We model the decision process as a three-stage Stackelberg game, where the captive first announces an interest rate, then the manufacturer announces her wholesale price, and finally the retailer decides the order quantity. To attract external investors, the objective of the captive is to break even against the retailer’s credit rating, the same as the bank if it finances the retailer. While the bank achieves the breaking-even through an interest rate menu, we are interested in whether the captive can achieve it through a single value interest rate, which may reduce the implicit restriction of the menu on decisions of supply chain members, and lead to larger profits for them. To our best knowledge, we are the first to propose and model the breaking-even mechanism with a single interest rate, and demonstrate that its requirement on the specialty on supply chain operations prevents the bank lack of such knowledge from performing it. While the manufacturer bears the full payment risks of the retailer and her own bankruptcy risks if she borrows bank loans under trade financing, she only bears part of retailer’s payment risks according to her share on the captive and avoids her bankruptcy risks under captive financing, which may counterbalance the benefit of joint optimization over operational and financial decisions under trade financing, and thus lead to larger profits for the manufacturer. Numerical analysis also reveals that the manufacturer, retailer and external investors can all benefit from captive financing when the credit rating of the manufacturer is low while the credit rating of the retailer is not too low.

六、报告人简介

赵文辉,美国俄亥俄州立大学运筹学博士;清华大学土木工程硕士、土木/计算机双学士。2010年8月加入上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院、2012年8月晋升副教授、2018年8月晋升终身职副教授、同年12月破格晋升教授、2024年晋升长聘教授。上海高校特聘教授(东方学者)。中国管理科学与工程学会供应链与运营管理分会副主任、学术委员会顾问。论文发表在Management Science, Operations Research, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, Math Programming等国际运营/数学期刊,SCI引用1100余次、SSCI引用800余次;单篇引用Web of Science核心合集550余次、Google Scholar 820余次。成果被Manufacturing & Service Operations Management期刊论文进行了实证检验。指导了世界500强企业供应链金融项目,试运行9个月直接经济效益1千万元;实施前三年和后三年净利润、营运资金周转率等指标变化显著。主持国家自科重点项目《关键核心产品供应链风险防控与智能管理》。


  • 临港校区:上海市浦东新区海港大道1550号(近沪城环路古棕路)  邮编:201306
  • 港湾校区:上海市浦东新区浦东大道2600号(近金桥路) 邮编:200136