上海海事大学滴水湖经济与管理论坛系列报告之三十六:Group Buying Mechanisms under Quantity Discounts
2015年07月02日
题目:Group Buying Mechanisms under Quantity Discounts
报告人:Rachel Chen(UC Davis教授,)
时间:7月8日上午10:15
地点:经管学院335会议室
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报告摘要:
  When a seller offers quantity discounts, interested buyers may either self-organize or rely on a third party to aggregate their purchasing quantities to obtain lower prices, referred to as group buying. A group buying mechanism is a set of rules that determine the amount each buyer will purchase and the price each buyer will pay. In this paper, we analyze and compare the outcomes of group buying given a seller's quantity discount schedule under both the uniform price (where buyers pay at the same unit price obtained by the group) and non-uniform price group buying mechanisms.
报告人简介
  Rachel Chen博士本科毕业于同济大学计算机科学专业,硕士毕业于复旦大学管理信息系统专业,于2002年获得康奈尔大学运营管理专业博士学位。
Rachel Chen博士主要从事运营研究、供应链管理,服务运营和动态定价领域的研究。她目前有多篇论文发表在国际顶级期刊如IIE Transactions, Management Science, Marketing Science, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, Operations Research Letters, 和Production and Operations Management上。她曾担任Decision Science的副主编, 现为《Decision Science Journal》 、《IIE Transactions》 、《Production and Operations Management》编委。 
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